Law Expert: Too Weak Legal Basis for Dissolution

When law becomes a tool of control: Human rights law expert criticizes Japan’s dangerous precedent undermining religious liberty

Bitter Winter, the world’s leading online magazine on religious liberty and human rights, published 22^nd April 2026 an article by French Attorney Patricia Duval, expert in international human rights law. She examines a central legal question arising from the Tokyo High Court’s decision to dissolve the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification in Japan – whether such a far-reaching restriction on religious freedom can genuinely be said to be “prescribed by law” under international human rights standards.

See more by Patricia Duval: Religious Freedom in Jeopardy After Dissolution

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Her analysis situates the case within the framework of Article 18.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which permits limitations on freedom of religion only under strict conditions. Among these, the requirement that any restriction be “prescribed by law” is foundational, as it safeguards individuals against arbitrary or politically motivated interference.

Duval begins by framing the dissolution order as a severe intrusion into the collective and individual rights of believers. Dissolving a religious legal entity does not merely regulate administrative structures; it directly affects the ability of adherents to organize, worship, and express their beliefs in community. Because of this, such a measure must pass a high threshold of legal justification. It is not enough that a law exists in a formal sense – the law must also meet qualitative standards of clarity, accessibility, and predictability.

At first glance, the Japanese authorities appear to have acted within a statutory framework. The Religious Corporations Act allows courts to dissolve a religious organization if it engages in conduct that violates laws and regulations and substantially harms public welfare. This provision seems to provide a legal basis for state intervention. However, Duval argues that the mere existence of a legal provision is insufficient to satisfy international requirements. The decisive issue is whether the law is formulated with enough precision to allow individuals and organizations to foresee the consequences of their actions and adjust their behavior accordingly.

This requirement of foreseeability is well established in international human rights law. The Siracusa Principles, which interpret limitation clauses under the ICCPR, emphasize that any rule restricting fundamental rights must be clear and accessible. Laws must not be so vague or open-ended that they permit arbitrary enforcement. In Duval’s view, the Japanese provision fails this test because it relies heavily on ambiguous concepts such as “public welfare” without offering a concrete definition.

The ambiguity of “public welfare” is a recurring concern. International oversight bodies have repeatedly urged Japan to clarify this notion, warning that vague terminology can be used to justify excessive restrictions on fundamental freedoms. Despite these recommendations spanning more than a decade, no meaningful legislative reform has been undertaken. As a result, the legal standard remains indeterminate, leaving both religious groups and courts without clear guidance on its scope and limits.

Duval strengthens her argument by drawing a comparison with prior international case law. In particular, she references a decision involving legislation on extremism in another jurisdiction, where the Human Rights Committee found that overly broad and undefined terms rendered the law incompatible with the ICCPR. The absence of precise criteria meant that individuals could not reasonably predict what conduct would be deemed unlawful. By analogy, she contends that Japan’s reliance on an undefined concept of public welfare creates a similar problem.

A further complication arises from the interpretation of what constitutes a “violation of laws and regulations”. Traditionally, this phrase would be understood to refer to breaches of clearly established statutory provisions. However, Japanese courts have expanded its meaning to include civil liability for torts. This shift significantly broadens the scope of conduct that can trigger dissolution, moving beyond explicit legal prohibitions to encompass more general notions of wrongdoing.

The inclusion of civil torts introduces an additional layer of uncertainty. Civil liability often depends on flexible standards such as reasonableness or social acceptability, which are inherently context-dependent and open to interpretation. In the cases cited by the High Court, the determination of wrongdoing frequently rested on whether certain fundraising practices were socially inappropriate. Such criteria are not only subjective but also variable over time and across social contexts.

Duval highlights that this reliance on “social appropriateness” undermines the predictability required by international law. If individuals cannot clearly determine in advance whether their conduct will be deemed acceptable, they are effectively deprived of the ability to regulate their behavior in accordance with the law. This unpredictability is particularly problematic when the consequences include the dissolution of an entire religious organization.

The situation is further complicated by the temporal dimension of the evidence used to justify the dissolution. Many of the court decisions cited by the High Court concern events that occurred decades ago. Moreover, there is acknowledgment that no recent cases of similar misconduct have been established, particularly after internal reforms were implemented by the organization in question. Despite this, the court justified dissolution on the basis of a potential risk of future violations.

From a legal standpoint, basing such a severe measure on speculative future risks rather than demonstrable current conduct raises serious concerns. It suggests that the threshold for intervention has been lowered, allowing authorities to act on hypothetical scenarios rather than concrete evidence. This approach is difficult to reconcile with the principle that restrictions on fundamental rights must be necessary and grounded in clearly defined legal criteria.

Duval also points to the broader context in which the interpretation of the law shifted. The change in how authorities applied the dissolution provisions occurred relatively abruptly, following a period of intense public and media scrutiny. This sudden reinterpretation, after years of a more limited understanding, further undermines the argument that the law was foreseeable. If even the authorities themselves did not apply the provision in this expanded manner until recently, it is unreasonable to expect that the affected religious community could have anticipated such a development.

The High Court attempted to address concerns about unpredictability by arguing that existing case law provided sufficient guidance. According to this reasoning, prior judicial decisions established criteria that could inform the organization’s conduct. However, Duval challenges this assertion, noting that the underlying criteria in those cases were themselves vague and inconsistently applied. Rather than clarifying the law, the reliance on such case law perpetuates uncertainty.

Taken together, these factors lead to a central conclusion: the legal framework used to justify the dissolution does not meet the standard of being “prescribed by law” as required under Article 18.3 of the ICCPR. The combination of vague statutory language, expansive judicial interpretation, reliance on subjective criteria, and sudden shifts in application creates a legal environment that lacks the necessary clarity and predictability.

This conclusion has broader implications beyond the specific case. It underscores the importance of maintaining rigorous standards when restricting fundamental rights, particularly freedom of religion. Laws that are imprecise or inconsistently applied risk becoming tools of arbitrary governance, even if they are formally enacted. The requirement that restrictions be clearly defined is not a mere technicality; it is a safeguard against abuse and a cornerstone of the rule of law.

In rephrasing Duval’s argument, the core issue is not whether the state has any authority to regulate religious organizations, but whether it has done so in a manner consistent with its international obligations. The answer she provides is negative. The dissolution order, in her analysis, rests on a legal foundation that is too uncertain and too elastic to justify such a profound interference with religious freedom.

Ultimately, the article invites readers to reflect on the balance between state power and individual rights. It emphasizes that even in cases where concerns about public welfare are invoked, those concerns must be addressed through laws that are precise, transparent, and applied in a predictable manner. Without these safeguards, the legitimacy of any restriction on fundamental freedoms is highly questionable.

See more by Patricia Duval: Religious Freedom in Jeopardy After Dissolution

See also Japan’s Treatment of Faith Headed to The Hague?

See also Believers’ Last Hope for Fair Trial Crushed

See also Japanese Court Order Fulfilling Terrorist’s Wish

See also Hostile Interpretation of Belief in Tokyo Court

See also The Return of Labeling Faith as Manipulation

Text: Knut Holdhus, editor

Featured image above: Patricia Duval – Member of the Paris Bar Association, specializing in international human rights law. She obtained a degree in public law from the Sorbonne University in France. She has defended the rights of religious minorities and believers both in France and internationally, including in international organizations such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations. She has also published numerous academic papers on religion and freedom of belief. Photo: Sekai Nippo

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