When Media Narratives Become State Repression

How alarmist narratives circulated uncritically by media for years led to Japan’s and South Korea’s expanding control over minority religions

The relationship between media narratives and state power has become increasingly significant in contemporary debates about religious freedom and social control. In societies marked by rapid information circulation, emotionally charged reporting, and public anxieties surrounding “dangerous groups”, media discourse does not merely reflect public sentiment; it actively shapes the legal and political frameworks through which minority religions are understood and governed. One of the most consequential mechanisms within this process is guilt by association: the transformation of accusations directed at leaders, members, or isolated incidents into a generalized condemnation of an entire religious community. Once this mechanism becomes normalized in public discourse, it can move beyond stigma and produce concrete institutional effects.

See also: Japan Breaking Faith of Children of Believers

See also Supreme Court Justice with Hostile Views

See also Preserving Religious Activity After Dissolution

See also Election Campaign Fuels Unificationism Claims

See also History Often Vindicates the Dreamers

See also Korean Media Allegations: Clarifying the Facts

Recent developments in Japan and South Korea demonstrate how narratives originally constructed through media framing and “anti-cult” rhetoric can evolve into direct state intervention against religious minorities. In both countries, public controversies involving religious organizations have generated conditions in which legal categories, administrative procedures, and political discourse increasingly treat certain religious groups not as communities protected by freedom of religion, but as social threats requiring supervision, restriction, or elimination. These developments reveal how modern democratic states may absorb and formalize media-generated suspicions into law and public policy.

Maria Vardé’s article, “Beyond the Leader. 2. The Legal Effects of Guilt by Association”, published in Bitter Winter on 14^th May 2026, explores this transition from cultural stigma to institutional consequence. The article argues that media narratives do not simply influence how the public perceives minority religions; they may also create the emotional and political atmosphere necessary for governments to justify extraordinary legal measures. Through examples from Japan, South Korea, and Argentina, Vardé traces how accusations associated with individuals can be expanded into narratives depicting entire religious organizations as inherently manipulative, fraudulent, or dangerous.

The Japanese case following the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (安倍晋三) in July 2022 provides one of the clearest illustrations of this dynamic. The assassin, Tetsuya Yamagami (山上徹也), explained that he held deep resentment toward the Unification Church – in Japan, since 2015 the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification – because his mother had allegedly made excessive donations to the movement years earlier. Abe himself was targeted because of his public connections to organizations linked to the Family Federation. However, according to Vardé, the media and “anti-cult” commentators gradually reframed the event in a way that shifted moral responsibility away from the assassin and onto the religious organization itself.

Within this narrative transformation, Yamagami increasingly appeared in public discourse not primarily as the perpetrator of political violence, but as a victim shaped by the religious group’s influence. Simultaneously, the Federation came to be represented as the deeper cause of the assassination. This reframing had consequences extending far beyond media commentary. It contributed to a political climate in which Japanese authorities altered the interpretation of laws governing religious corporations.

Historically, the dissolution of religious organizations in Japan had generally required evidence of criminal conduct. Yet after Abe’s assassination and the extensive public campaign against the Family Federation, earlier civil disputes concerning donations were reinterpreted as sufficient grounds for requesting dissolution. Courts accepted this expanded interpretation, thereby lowering the threshold for state intervention against a religious body.

Vardé emphasizes that this process depended heavily on anti-cult concepts such as “brainwashing” and “mind control” [See editor’s note 1 below]. Under this framework, the religious teachings and practices of the faith minority were no longer viewed as expressions of faith or spiritual discipline, but as mechanisms designed to manipulate followers financially and psychologically. The voluntary actions of believers – particularly donations – were recast as inherently invalid because members were presumed incapable of exercising genuine free will.

This narrative produced a powerful legal implication: if followers were assumed to be permanently manipulated, then even the absence of complaints could be interpreted as evidence of continued control. The organization itself therefore came to be portrayed not merely as controversial, but as structurally deceptive and socially harmful. According to the article, the practical consequences were immediate and severe. Religious facilities were closed, assets were transferred to liquidators, and the ordinary religious lives of believers were disrupted while the organization faced potential dissolution.

South Korea presents a related but distinct development. There, guilt by association has also expanded from media discourse into legislative initiatives. The article discusses the case involving Hak Ja Han (한학자) – also called Mother Han – co-founder and leader of the Family Federation, who became embroiled in allegations concerning political bribery connected to associates and public officials. Although she denied knowledge or involvement, the controversy intensified broader political efforts to increase state oversight of religious organizations.

In early 2026, the left-leaning Lee Jae-myung (이재명) administration of South Korea introduced legislation commonly referred to as the “Church Dissolution Act”. Although framed in neutral legal language, the political discourse surrounding the bill reportedly made clear that organizations such as the Family Federation and Shincheonji [See editor’s note 2 below] were among its primary targets. The proposed law would authorize extensive state powers, including compulsory inspections, interrogation of religious leaders, revocation of legal status, dissolution of organizations, and state control over assets.

Unlike the Japanese case, which emerged from a specific national trauma tied to Abe’s assassination, the South Korean proposal appears to institutionalize a broader mechanism of state supervision over religions considered socially or politically problematic. Vardé argues that this marks a significant shift. The issue is no longer limited to responding to a singular controversy; rather, the state acquires a generalized framework for regulating or potentially eliminating religious groups perceived as undesirable.

A central concern raised throughout the article is that these policies are often justified through language that appears reasonable and protective. Governments and media actors invoke concepts such as victim protection, public safety, social order, or national security. Yet beneath this reassuring vocabulary lies a deeper transformation: as Vardé points out, actions attributed to specific individuals becomes generalized across entire communities.

In this sense, guilt by association becomes more than a social prejudice. It evolves into an administrative and legal principle capable of restructuring the boundaries of religious freedom. Once suspicion is embedded into institutional procedures, religious belonging itself may acquire legal significance. Minority faiths become vulnerable not because of demonstrable criminal conduct by all members, but because narratives surrounding leaders, associates, or isolated incidents allow the state to treat the entire organization as inherently suspect.

The experiences of Japan and South Korea therefore illustrate a broader contemporary problem: the convergence of media sensationalism, “anti-cult” discourse, and expanding state authority. Vardé’s analysis suggests that when emotionally charged narratives dominate public debate, democratic institutions may gradually normalize exceptional measures against unpopular religions. What begins as media framing can ultimately reshape legal doctrine, administrative practice, and the lived reality of religious communities.

By examining these developments, the article raises important questions about the fragility of religious liberty in modern societies. It invites reflection on how democratic states balance public concern with the protection of minority rights, and how quickly narratives of suspicion can become embedded in systems of governance. Most importantly, it warns that when guilt by association is accepted as a legitimate framework for public policy, the transition from social stigma to institutional repression may occur with surprising ease.

See also: Japan Breaking Faith of Children of Believers

See also Supreme Court Justice with Hostile Views

See also Preserving Religious Activity After Dissolution

See also Election Campaign Fuels Unificationism Claims

See also History Often Vindicates the Dreamers

See also Korean Media Allegations: Clarifying the Facts

See also Shocking Pretrial Detention of Faith Leader (95)

Text: Knut Holdhus, editor

Maria Vardé graduated in Anthropological Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires and is currently a researcher at the Instituto de Ciencias Antropológicas, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Institute of Anthropological Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities, University of Buenos Aires). She has written and lectured on archeology, spirituality, and freedom of religion or belief.

Featured image above: Alarmist media narratives leading to state repression in South Korea and Japan. Illustration: ChatGPT, 15th May 2026 

[Editor’s note 1: In Japan, the “mind-control” myth has been a powerful tool used to stigmatize and suppress new religious movements (NRMs), particularly since the 1980s. The concept suggests that NRMs manipulate or “brainwash” their followers, depriving them of free will and rational thought. This narrative gained traction after the 1995 Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack, when public fear of dangerous cults intensified. Although Aum was an extreme and violent exception, the incident cast suspicion on all NRMs, allowing critics, media, and the government to label diverse groups as manipulative or psychologically coercive.

The “mind-control” myth serves multiple social and political functions. It simplifies complex questions of belief, making it easier to portray converts as victims rather than as individuals exercising spiritual agency. This framing justifies legal and social intervention, including the coercive “deprogramming” of believers – sometimes involving confinement or psychological pressure to force renunciation of faith. Lawyers, ex-member groups, and certain media outlets have used the idea of mind control to construct NRMs as threats to family stability and national order, reinforcing social conformity and Japan’s preference for established, non-controversial religions such as Buddhism and Shinto.

In recent years, the myth resurfaced following the 2022 assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose attacker cited resentment toward the Family Federation. A public outrage largely created by media reignited scrutiny of NRMs, and politicians and journalists revived “mind-control” rhetoric to explain fundraising and recruitment practices. Critics argue that this framing discourages genuine religious tolerance and critical examination of Japan’s restrictive religious climate. Overall, the “mind-control” myth functions less as a scientific or psychological concept and more as a moral panic – a cultural weapon used to delegitimize minority faiths and to reaffirm mainstream social norms about religion, obedience, and the boundaries of acceptable belief.]

[Editor’s note 2: Shincheonji, officially known as Shincheonji Church of Jesus, the Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony, is a new religious movement founded in South Korea in 1984 by Lee Man-hee, who claims to be the promised pastor mentioned in the Bible’s Book of Revelation. Shincheonji teaches that the Book of Revelation is being fulfilled through its church and that Lee Man-hee has received divine revelation to interpret it.]

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